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I. Introduction
The period of the Rhodesian Front party's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) is
sometimes described as providing a "hot-house" atmosphere for economic development, a characterisation
which stems from extraordinary rates of growth from 1966-1974 as well as from the various barriers to free
financial flows erected by the state.1 These barriers imposed a condition of semi-autarchy on the financial
circuit of capital, which in turn had implications for accumulation and uneven geographical and sectoral
development. The most significant of these may be that the hot-house financial environment exacerbated
capitalist boom-bust tendencies, in an economic context which was already deteriorating due largely to
overproduction in relation to the small size of the local market, as well as to exogenous factors.
When a classic crisis of "overaccumulation"2 of capital emerged in the mid 1970s, the effect on the
social and political formation was formidable, and indeed has not been resolved to this date. One reason
why different attempts to deal with the crisis have not been successful is that economic development has
generally been viewed in static and aspatial terms, with scant regard for the complex roles of space and of
time. This, then, is a key challenge to the paper: while constructing an empirically- and theoretically-
informed argument about the Rhodesian UDI period, I attempt to analyze spatial and temporal features that
shed brighter light on limits to the economy's development.
To begin, it is demonstrated that in the wake of a half decade of economic stagnation (1960-65), UDI
featured a shift in the Rhodesian economy's general direction of accumulation, its geographical orientation
and the financial intermediation it required. Finance was at the heart of the shift, but in a dominated, not
dominant way (Section 2). With financial capital repressed, it was the resurgence of manufacturing capital
that powered the 1966-1974 boom (manufacturing was responsible for a quarter of GDP by that stage, and
annual GDP growth averaged 9.5% over the nine years) (Section 3).
This in turn demonstrates how even on the semi-periphery of the world economy, a relatively
autarchic economy can grow extremely rapidly, and an increasingly empowered state can direct investment
in a manner conducive to corporate profitability. It is important, however, to understand some of the
preconditions for this centrally-directed economic dynamism: existing manufacturing production
overcapacity, the powerful yet flexible state economic policy apparatus, the cohesion and class solidarity of
industrialists, and the availability of cheap, repressed labour.
Crisis emerged, nevertheless, and decimated most spheres of manufacturing in the late 1970s. It is
difficult to abstract locally-generated economic factors from issues such as political conflict, civil war and
global economic recession (Section 4). But the organic roots of the crisis can be discerned, with subsector-
level data, by examining the degree to which manufacturing output increased in the wake of untenable new
fixed capital investments, which in the context of limited effective demand, resulted in year-end stockpiles
and inventories at record levels (Section 5).
The crisis was met with various kinds of responses. From the mid 1970s, Rhodesia experienced an
ambiguous process of uneven geographical and temporal development, in part reflecting weaknesses in state
policies aimed at levelling growth across space and at stimulating financial sector activity. Ultimately, both
spatial (Section 6) and temporal (Section 7) attempts to deal with the overaccumulation and uneven
development problems in the late 1970s — in particular regional decentralisation initiatives and loosely-
guarded credit markets during a period of monetary conservatism — were ineffectual, even if a decade later
they provided a spectacular denouement to the structural crisis (Section 8).
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 See, eg, Seidman, A. (1986), Money, Banking and Public Finance in Africa, London: Zed, p.67.
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 In terms of productive capital, overaccumulation is defined roughly as the emergence of surpluses of capital and labour, with
no profitable means of joining the two in production.
2. Financial Autarchy and Economic Growth, 1966-70
2.1 Import substitution and domestic demand stimulation
The Rhodesian financial system was a crucial sector during the first, high-growth period of UDI
(1966-74), both because reigns on finance encouraged capital accumulation to proceed in a temporarily-
sustainable direction, and because the state effectively prevented geographical capital flight. "The directors
of the national economy were already using their main weapon," recounted Handford (a Rhodesian Front
economist): "bottling up capital by severe exchange control restrictions. The bottled up money was
channelled via the money market to scores of manufacturers who would show that they could set up, quickly
and efficiently, factories to produce most of the goods put under sanctions."3
In the same vein, Riddell's extensive study of the country's manufacturing sector boom concluded
that (contrary to accepted wisdom), "the major import-substitutions thrust occurred prior to UDI, with the
major source of manufacturing growth in the UDI period being domestic demand expansion" (emphasis
added). According to Riddell, increased effective demand within Rhodesia was responsible for a vast amount
(61%) of the manufacturing growth which occurred during the years 1964-78, as compared to import
substitution industrialisation (30%) and export-based growth (9%).4 Subsequently, excessive new capital
investment in the mid 1970s adversely affected accumulation, as shown in Section 5. But it is important,
first, to stress the sources of effective demand, because in view of the hostility the Rhodesian Front initially
faced from financiers who had earlier controlled domestic demand management, the new regime's
management of key financial markets was by no means predetermined.
2.2 Bottling up financial capital
The basis for a shift of monetary and financial regulatory responsibilities from the London-based
banks to the state had been established during the 1950s, in response to a variety of problems arising from
excessive credit creation and speculation.3 In addition to the short-term need to control overambitious
financial flows, government restrictions also addressed an earlier overaccumulation problem which was
becoming evident by the late 1950s and which, added to the political turmoil of the era, led to excessive
speculation in property and, by the early 1960s, a large net outflow of capital.6 Extraordinary levels of state
intervention in the financial system ultimately proved crucial in deflecting the financial brouhaha that
surrounded the declaration of UDI itself, in late I965.7
Tight exchange controls applied as early as 1961 and 1963 brought the entirety of Rhodesia's
international financial dealings under government purview. The Reserve Bank assumed responsibility for
overall coordination of exchange control in 1965. Also that year, exchange controls on dealing in external
3
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shares began the domestic reflation process. And in the context of economic crisis still underway during
the early 1960s, trade controls were tightened to give Rhodesian manufacturers support.8
Partly as a result of the local restrictions, Southern Rhodesian economic vulnerability to a potentially
punitive British government and City of London was qualitatively reduced in the period leading to UDI.
Rhodesian external government bonds suffered devaluation (by some 23%, compared to Zambia's 20%) at
the hands of City traders in the months prior to UDI as racial politics deteriorated.9 Yet a growing sense
of self-confidence was felt by the Rhodesian Front after extremely successful elections in May 1965. In
November, when UDI was declared and the financial doors slammed shut, the Rhodesians responded by
defaulting on R$82.6 million in foreign debts.10
South African banks offered support in the evasion of sanctions and in lubricating anonymous
trade,11 while London Sunday Times investigations also established that from 1972, imports of steel-making
equipment were being financed by Swiss and Austrian banks.12 Thus perhaps the only significant domestic
effect of what was termed the "financial squeeze" was a temporary decline in bank credit outstanding, which
was addressed by an immediate Reserve Bank infusion of £13 million a month after UDI.13
Short- and medium-term cooperation between the regime and the major financial institutions was a
crucial component of UDI*s initial economic successes. "British-controlled banks in Rhodesia, presumably
not wishing business to foreign banks, reportedly put their foreign currencies in South Africa before UDI,
and it appeared that this helped them to extend credit against blocked accounts," reports Handford.14 In the
s
 The trade controls took many by surprise. Domestic industrialists, suspicious of the Rhodesian Front regime which had taken
power in 1962, and still suffering from overinvestment and stagnation, won surprisingly generous tariffs and export incentives.
"Rightly," Property and Finance commented in January 1965, "the new Rhodesia Government in the past two years has been
Protection-minded to an extent which even the most temperamental manufacturers — and there are many of them! — can applaud."
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 Handford gloated about how successful the countervailing efforts had been:
When the full story of the "whisking away" of considerably more than half of the fixed and liquid Rhodesian
reserves in London is eventually told, it will read like a James Bond thriller. Weary officials of the Reserve
Bank and of the Treasury regard the secret removal, only a matter of hours before the Independence
Proclamation, as the auspicious start of Rhodesia's counter-attack against the British sanctions... Probably the
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Under Sanctions, pp.18,50).
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Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, London: Croom Helm, pp.69-70.)
" Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe, p. 104.
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 This was accomplished by lowering reserve balances from 6% to 3 % for commercial bank demand deposits, thus freeing funds
for lending. By 1966, notes Handford, "The money market seemed flooded with funds which, for one reason or another, holders
wanted to keep fairly liquid." (A Portrait of an Economy Under Sanctions, p.48.)
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words of a former chairperson of Barclays, "UDI had in effect been anticipated and made no change in the
administration of the bank's affairs save that London could no longer approve nor reject proposals put
forward by Salisbury... (By 1971) the best possible use had been made of six difficult years."15
Simultaneously, Seidman contends, "The foreign banks became more closely interlinked, not only with each
other but also with other financial institutions, on account of their collaboration in the face of United Nations
sanctions to mobilize locally generated investable surpluses, primarily to finance the transnational corporate
affiliates' expanding activities in the modern sector."16
Exchange controls trapped not only local financial resources and the profits of multinational
corporations, but also existing bank deposits of non-residents, which by the late 1970s accounted for a third
of the stock of surplus funds that banks had available for loans.17 According to Clarke, the system of
financial autarchy was convincingly in place by the late 1960s:
The controls worked, especially when combined with buoyant growth conditions in the
economy associated to high net white immigration (and rising mortgage demand), rapid
industrial development through diversification (and demand for hire purchase and leasing
facilities), and expanded primary sector output (with demands for short- and medium-term
financing). All these developments widened the base of the institutions, led to diversification
within them, increased intra-sectoral linkages and flows, and strengthened the financial
sector's structure.18
2.3 Finance and white housing
Finally, a good example of the impact of
blocked liquidity was on the development of the white
housing sector, which was the main beneficiary of
property finance in the late 1960s (Figure 1). The
imposition of financial sanctions, "if anything, boosted
the business of the building society movement," argued
the chair of the country's largest society.19 According
to Hand ford, "Money started to be bottled up in
Rhodesia — a tendency which greatly increased after
UDI. As a consequence, people spent money on
houses and there was a boom."20
By 1967, the Herald reported, "It appears that
a rapid build-up of funds available for housing
combined with a popular conviction of political
certainty, has taken the cork out of the bottle."21 At the time, residential building costs in Salisbury were
only a quarter of those in Lusaka and 40% lower than in South Africa, which encouraged a further
development of the Salisbury suburban sprawl and flow of finance into land improvements. Thus the real
estate market in 1970 was profoundly influenced by financial investment capital, said a long-time
practitioner, John Parkin: "The recent surge in development can be attributed to various factors which are
not altogether necessarily indicative of political confidence. It is certain that some building, essentially large
developments, has been prompted by a need to find acceptable investment for surplus funds rather than
because of any great expectations."22
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3. The Resurgence of Manufacturing Capital, 1966-74
Aside from marshalling financial capital in the national interest, other explanations for Rhodesia's
UDI economic strength, particularly in manufacturing, must also be considered: the role of pre-UDI
investment, the ability of the state to intervene strategically, the cohesion and flexibility of industrial capital,
and the low wages paid to generally pliant workers. We will consider each in turn.
3.1 Surplus capacity
During the 1954-63 years of the Central
African Federation (the temporary administrative union
of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia [Zambia]
and Nyasaland [Malawi]), more than £1 billion was
invested in total fixed capital stock. In the industrial
sectors (mining, manufacturing and electricity) there
emerged, as a result, enormous and consistent year-end
stockpiles which rose to annual levels of £40 million
from 1961-66, in the course of a devastating economic
recession that coincided with political uncertainty over
the future of Britain's Central African colonies.23
According to Rob Davies, manufacturing
overcapacity in the diminished post-Federation market
served as the "primary" basis for the subsequent
explosive growth in manufacturing output. In 1962, capacity utilisation in the sector had dropped to less
than 60%. Indeed, Davies notes that the rate of net new investment in manufacturing averaged 11.7% from
1955 to 1964 — mostly in the late 1950s — as opposed to just 4.4% from 1965 to 1972.24 As expansion
began in 1966, what was particularly important about the use of the overcapacity was the extraordinary
flexibility subsequently shown by both capitalists (who organised an extension of product lines largely on
the basis of existing plant and equipment prior to 1970) and black workers who adapted to the initial skills
shortage caused by early 1960s white emigration, and to the new production demands. Manufacturing fixed
capital investment remained relatively meagre until 1973, particularly compared to the late 1950s and mid
1970s. This is clear in terms of the ratio of new investment to year-end stocks of inventories, as shown in
Figure 2.
3.2 State policies
To sustain capital accumulation on a wider scale, and to organise the disparate parts of an economy
under seige, intensified state intervention was crucial. From late 1965, the state focused unprecedented
resources on controlling external account balances, encouraging immigration of skilled white males, ensuring
labour market stability, cementing land inequality, expanding police and military control, and subsidising
all manner of white business ventures. Although government spending as a percentage of GDP declined
from 49% during the period of Federation to less than 30% in 1968 as the manufacturing boom took off,
the percentage subsequently rose to the high 40s. Aside from the prodigal war costs in the late 1970s, UDI
state spending also included new investments in transport (especially rail and airlines), energy, posts and
telecommunications, and purchasing and marketing authorities.25
23
 New manufacturing capital spending in Southern Rhodesia subsequently declined to an annual level (£13.4 million in 1964)
of just one third the 1959 peak. The ratio of manufacturing inventories to new fixed capital invested — a ratio which indicates the
degree to which overinvestment has occurred — soared from an already high 182% in 1958, to 520% in 1962, and 600% in 1965,
and inventories also increased substantially in relation to gross manufacturing output. (Central Statistical Office Census of
production, various years.)
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Manufacturing firms warmly welcomed state support, and the Minister of Finance was extravagant:
"Assistance will be afforded by means of import control for selected industries for specific periods of time,
greater use of the customs tariff, and in special circumstances, securing of the local market for one or more
products for specified periods."26 This entailed waiving overseas firms* production rights, licensing
arrangements and trade marks, as well as other constraints against technology transfer. Too, there was other
aid given to the Rhodesian economy from neighbouring states, namely sanctions-busting, transport
arrangements, loans and other assistance from South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique. Stoneman
concludes that "the advent of sanctions and the need to combat the effects resulted in a closing of the
economy which could never have been justified ideologically, but which prevented a serious haemorrhaging
of the industrial base."27
3.3 Manufacturing capitalists1 cohesion
The manner in which the industrial base of the economy closed ranks to support the Rhodesian Front
is worth some comment. Organised business lobbies ACCOR and ARNI had officially and energetically
opposed UDI, and in early 1965 published reports on the "potentially disastrous" effect of an independence
declaration.28 It was widely assumed that a crippling set of economic sanctions would be the minimum
response from Britain. At the outset, South Africa's Rand Daily Mail reported that "there is confusion in
all sections of the business field" in Rhodesia,29 and initially, the fear of sanctions appeared well-founded,
since 1966 saw a 6.5% decline in manufacturing gross output before inflation, and, more disturbingly,
manufacturing volume declined 9.3%.
The head of Dunlop's local subsidiary later explained, "Having taken a deep breath and having
assessed the direction in which the economy should go, by the end of 1966 Rhodesian businessmen were
exhibiting a remarkable degree of optimism, ingenuity and determination that the economy must not be
destroyed by the new conditions produced by world sanctions."30 Merchants and financiers who had earlier
backed an anti-UDI compromise, organised the import control system nearly overnight. Handford describes
how "Rhodesian industrialists jumped in quickly, made arrangements with overseas organisations, set up
things in back alleys — one thousand new industries in a few years." Sanctions-busting became a national
pass-time: "Here a James Bond would truly be at home — "Universal Exports" — distribution with a
network centred on obscure offices in back streets of cities in Europe — as fast as one London press-man
uncovered a hide-out, another would be set up."31 There were only rare desertions by business leaders.32
3.4 Cheap labour
In addition to the generally pro-business state, Rhodesian businesses had another major factor
working in their favour during this period, cheap labour. N.R. Bertram, a leading Rhodesian manufacturer
and merchant, was reported acknowledging in 1969, "It was impossible to say that industrial progress was
being inhibited by rising labour costs — over industry as a whole only 8% of the gross product was paid
26
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 In late 1968, the heads of Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (E.S. Newson) and Standard Bank (E. Campbell) issued
critiques of UDI and called for a settlement and fresh infusion of foreign funding. Prime Minister Ian Smith's reaction, according
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(Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, p.149.)
out as African wages."33 Even with a liberation war underway, Handford could brag in 1976, "At present,
possibly the biggest advantage enjoyed by Rhodesia in regard to the more developed nations is its absence
of labour troubles."34 There were, counters Sachikonye, no fewer than 68 trade union leaders in detention
in 1973:
It is scarcely surprising that in the 1960s and 1970s a dark cloud hovered over trade
unionism in Zimbabwe. A decimation of the leadership of unions through its incarceration
in detention or exile, the onerous labour laws, in addition to the dubious role of international
labour institutions such as the Brussels-based International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions — all had a generally weakening impact on the unions.3*
In sum, UDI growth depended upon reflated domestic demand supported by a regulated financial
sector and geographically-trapped multinational corporate profits and assets. And other accommodating
features that help account for the success of UDI in broadening and deepening the economy include the prior
overcapacity in manufacturing, state-directed investments, and an extremely repressed labour force.
Sanctions and planned investment ensured that the law of value did not fully operate according to
international norms. Capital expenditure did not become excessive until the mid 1970s, and overproduction
tendencies were initially muted. Indeed the organic composition of capital remained inordinately low until
the mid 1970s investment deluge.36 And thanks to import protection, Rhodesian manufacturers showed a
learned capacity to produce on relatively "short runs."37 As with manufacturing, agricultural investments
were also of an extensive (capital-widening) rather than intensive (capital-deepening) nature.38 Classic
disproportionalities between the two "Departments of Production" (ie, those producing capital goods and
those producing consumer goods) were, partly as a result, kept effectively in check for a full decade.
4. Explanations for the Crisis, 1974-78
But an economy-wide downturn ultimately set in following the first UDI decade of growth. The
manufacturing sector witnessed immense increases in accumulated stocks and inventories, and an
extraordinary decline in capacity utilisation. By all accounts, the resulting drought of industrial investment
has remained the single major constraint on the economy's growth through the 1980s and early 1990s. And
efforts to displace the economic problems through space and through time also came to naught, as subsequent
sections demonstrate.
4.1 Exogenous factors
During the period 1974-78, manufacturing production declined 27%, capacity utilisation fell by 38%,
and there was a net loss of 50,000 urban private sector jobs (from a peak of just over one million in the
entire national economy), mainly in manufacturing and construction.39 Various economists have loosely
53
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explained Rhodesia's late 1970s problems by recourse to a wide variety of factors exogenous to an internal
logic of market failure. For example, an otherwise well-grounded empirical study of manufacturing by
Riddell relies upon the following sorts of explanations for the manufacturing sector's problems in the mid
1970s, in lieu of theoretically-derived arguments:
• major political disruption and uncertainty (especially war);
• a series of poor agricultural seasons;
• the international rise in oil prices; and
• the increasing foreign-exchange dependence of manufacturing growth and decreasing role
of manufactured exports in the economy.
"All these influences combined swamped the impact of the policies and incentives for manufacturing
still in place from the mid 1960s, which had created the record levels of manufacturing expansion achieved
in the first nine years of UDI," Riddell concludes.40 The Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries* chief
economist in the early 1990s attributed the late 1970s crisis to "the intensification of the liberation struggle,
the oil shock and the emigration of skilled manpower. "41 Even the political economist Seidman merely cites
the war and international recession as reasons for "hampered growth,"42 while, as with the others, no
mention is made of more general problems arising from the intrinsic character of value production and
realisation in Rhodesia.
Yet as Ernest Mandel once put it, "The detonator does not cause the crisis. It merely precipitates
it inasmuch as it triggers... the cumulative movement of the crisis: reduction in employment, incomes,
investment, production, etc... In order for it to be able to trigger this chain of events, however, a whole
series of preconditions must coincide, and these in no way flow automatically from the detonator itself."
(original emphasis)43 Using Riddell*s disaggregated manufacturing data and the Central Statistical Office's
Census of Production surveys, we can identify such preconditions in particular subsectors that came under
pressure (see Section 5).** Prior to that, however, exogenous factors stemming from international and
domestic influences are considered.
4.2 International influences
First, then, how strong a role did the operations of the international law of value play in crisis
formation in the Rhodesian economy? Kadhani insists that "At the level of technical and structural
parameters, the overall production performance of the economy continued to exhibit very rapid responses
to the international environment."45 Yet in many respects such a strong emphasis on global dynamics as the
reason for either the strong growth of the late 1960s, or the deep recession of the late 1970s, is
misleading.46 For example, Rhodesia's terms of trade declined momentarily when sanctions were imposed.
But sanctions cannot be held wholly responsible for long-term deterioration in income terms of trade, since
they mainly affected export volumes (not export values or imports). In any case, by 1968 their effect was,
in Davies' words, "negligible, causing a fall in export volumes of only about 5%... Sanctions are likely to
have had a once-and-for-all effect on the terms of trade, causing an initial but not a continuous
40
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deterioration."47 Terms of trade then improved dramatically in the early 1970s, reflecting mainly
speculation-driven upward price movements of minerals and agricultural commodities. The subsequent
global industrial shake-out was led by the dramatic collapse of the automobile and construction industries
(important users of Rhodesian mineral exports such as chrome and asbestos). This was followed by a two-
decade long collapse of international commodities prices to (in 1992) their lowest level in recorded
history.48 Such a downturn was no accident, nor merely an explanatory factor to account for local crisis
in Rhodesia, alongside other exogenous forces. It reflects rather too ominously the uneven sectoral and
spatial workings of the international system, as speculative financial fevers periodically ravage selected
markets and currencies.
Notwithstanding such external pressure, Rhodesian manufacturers performed surprisingly well in
earning foreign funds necessary for crucial imports.49 Direct foreign inputs were reduced as a percentage
of total manufacturing inputs from 42% at UDI to 35% a decade later. Problems with certain inputs arose
(and in the 1980s became severe), but in spite of global inflationary conditions hostile to importers of
industrial goods, the blockages and cost increases arising from foreign exchange shortages do not seem to
be the most serious dynamic underlying what was an exceptionally deep recession. Indeed as Section 5
shows, massive fixed capital investments occurred from 1974 through 1976, indicating that available foreign
exchange was at least sufficient for the most needed foreign inputs.
4.3 Domestic influences
If international developments in manufacturing did not by themselves devastate the industrial
economy of Rhodesia in the late 1970s, what were the domestic factors? It is important to look internally
for the well-spring of manufacturing crisis, since as international improvements occurred in the 1980s, they
largely bypassed Zimbabwe's economy. The main domestic influence was civil war, which had mixed
economic effects and need not detain us in this theoretical investigation.50
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An important means of interpreting the crisis often utilised by political economists is
"underconsumption theory": i.e., internal lack of effective demand was the key constraint faced by
Rhodesian manufacturers. In this vein, Davies and Stoneman argue, "It cannot be assumed that (the UDI
boom) would have continued in absence of war and world recession, for the most profitable import-
substitution possibilities were becoming exhausted and it is generally accepted that the discrimination against
the rural population and the low level of black wages must have restricted the size of the internal market."51
Indeed, per capita private fixed consumption expenditure peaked in 1972.52 Industrialists themselves
viewed the problem primarily in these terms at particular junctures, with 57% of those polled by the
University of Zimbabwe in 1981 (a year in which large real consumption increases occurred) citing
insufficient domestic demand as a factor constraining industrial expansion.33 The theory is backed by
evidence that profits (as opposed to wages and salaries) took an unusually high share of national income
during the 1970s.54 Yet Stoneman quickly advanced beyond simple underconsumption theory by examining
the articulation of production and consumption, in Rhodesia's notoriously skewed racial context:
The market became more distorted in the direction of luxury consumption, a tendency
reinforced by sanctions against imports. A number of manufacturing industries (in particular
in food processing and clothing) had developed to supply black needs both domestically and
in the Federation, and their attention was redirected to the white market... Much of the new
industry has therefore been at the expense of far more urgently needed rural investment and
is furthermore geared to supplying luxury products on a very small scale, rather than the
basic requirements of the population as a whole.53
This more closely matches the general argument about failed Import Substitution Industrialisation
models in the Third World.56 Wield concurs that in retrospect, a key reason for the early UDI growth was
that "luxury production used under-utilised capacity from earlier periods, often in a creative and innovative
fashion" to produce breakfast cereals, cube sugar, high quality furniture, lollipop sticks, canned asparagus,
bird seed, fifteen varieties of hair shampoo, ten different hand cleaners, five lipsticks, seven varieties of
swimming pool paints, and ten varieties of pet foods. These corresponded to a vast expansion in local
industrial production units (ie, with ten or more workers) from 665 at UDI to 1,036 five years later, as the
number of different products increased from 1,059 in 1967 to 3,837 in 1970.57 By 1971 it was said that the
homes of even high-income whites could be entirely furnished with Rhodesian-made goods.58 The
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backwards and forwards linkages of luxury goods production were tightly coordinated, due to high levels
of corporate concentration within most sectors of the national economy.59
As the crisis emerged, certain lines of consumer goods subsequently experienced dramatic declines.
Consumption of durable goods fell by 35% in real terms from 1974-77 (although sales of radios and
televisions — the largest durables component — doubled in 1978 and quadrupled again in 1980). Private
consumption of vehicles dropped by nearly half over the same period, picking up again in 1978, while
consumption of furniture and carpets dropped by 40% that year. Meanwhile, non-durable manufactured
goods (including food, drinks and tobacco) continued rising during the first two years of recession, then fell
by 11% in 1977 alone, but subsequently recovered strongly until 1980.60
Notwithstanding declines in these particular sectors, however, total consumption expenditure by
private residents actually increased in real terms from 1974-76. The single most substantial annual decline
in total consumption during the crisis was 12% (in 1977), a smaller drop than that experienced elsewhere
in the economy (eg, in manufacturing capacity utilisation).61 Thus, while manufacturing and agricultural
investment were devastated by the downturn, private consumption expenditure in the (mainly white) luxury-
goods market was not nearly so badly affected, which in turn suggests that underconsumption was not
obviously the driving force behind the crisis. In other words, the issue was not necessarily declining
absolute levels of consumption, though the unbalanced articulation between production and consumption was
certainly a deep-rooted structural problem.
At the other end of the racially-delineated consumption skew, low-income blacks still managed to
maintain purchases of consumer necessities throughout the recession. The volume of foodstuffs output, for
example, continued to grow (by 13%) during the 1974-78 downturn, and drink and tobacco edged up 2%.
"Annual reports from companies with large retailing and wholesaling operations report food sales holding
firm,11 according to Wield. However, as the recession hit black workers especially hard, larger purchases
such as furniture (blacks made up 51% of the domestic market) and even clothing and footwear (68% of the
market) suffered reductions of 28% and 12%, respectively.62
In sum it would appear that underconsumption theory has little to offer as a means of explaining the
intensity and timing of the crisis, and this is especially evident in the endurance of the crisis beyond
independence. For example, throughout the 1970s, the major food processing industries reflected the
residual strength of consumption in both white high-income and black low-income markets. Beer and wine
suffered virtually no underconsumption crisis, and along with cigarettes, represented the largest single item
(15%) of personal consumption expenditure. Similarly, meat processing and dairy products experienced
significant build-up of inventories mainly during the few years occasioned by point-of-production factors in
the fields, but both subsectors continued growing in real terms during the four worst years of economic
slump.
Thus the blame for Rhodesia's crisis cannot be laid primarily at the door of either low-income
blacks' failure to gain access to "basic need" commodities relative to their consumption of these in prior
years, or the failure of key counter-cyclical sectors (like construction) to maintain their pre-recession growth
rates. If such were the case, post-independence state fiscal expansion, and sustained building activity would
have led to a more sustainable growth path than was ultimately experienced.
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5. Overaccumulation, 1970-79
If underconsumption is an unsatisfactory theoretical basis for understanding the crisis, it is, instead,
to data covering manufacturing output, investment, year-end inventories ("stocks") and capacity utilisation
that we turn to consider an interpretation of what was an overproduction/overaccumidation crisis in the UDI
economy during the late 1970s. Taking 1970 as a base year, in real terms manufacturing output rose to
levels 60% higher by 1975, new investment rose by a factor of more than three, inventory build-up doubled,
and capacity utilisation and profits rose significantly (Figure 3). During the process, plant and equipment
took enormous amounts of new investment, as the manufacturing process deepened substantially: the mid
1970s investments were intensive (Figure 4) (in contrast to earlier extensive and small-scale investments).
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Then, following the 1975 peak, ratios of
inventories to output and especially of inventories to
new investment soared, as the problem rapidly became
full-blown (Figure 5). (This is as clear evidence of
overaccumulation as may have existed at this point
anywhere, yet was by and large ignored by Rhodesia's
period economists.)63 Net profit rates as a percentage
of gross national income rose to more than 20% in the
early 1970s, but declined rapidly thereafter, to 12% in
1977 .** -jijg manufacturing crisis stemmed from both
classic overinvestment in heavy industrial sectors
(Department One) and overinvestment in certain
consumer goods (Department Two). "It matters little
whether the slump begins in one or the other of these
two departments," Mandel notes. "Empirically, it may
be noted that most often it begins in Department Two... But this empirical fact expresses no particular
intrinsic logic."65 In Rhodesia's case, as we shall observe, key Department Two subsectors exacerbated
generalised overaccumulation in 1973, even before growth declined, but it was in Department One that
overaccumulation reached intolerable levels by the late 1970s.
63
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5./ Capitol goods
Consider first Department One branches of manufacturing, which were historically well-developed
and relatively balanced thanks to post-war Southern Rhodesian import protection. (The World Bank includes
as "capital goods" rubber, base metals, machinery — both electrical and non-electrical — and transport
equipment, and these categories will be used in what follows.^* Capital goods accounted for about half of
the country's manufacturing output and a third of all employment even prior to UDI. Metals and metal
products represented some 17% of manufacturing sector value added in 1960, and the subsequent rapid
growth and decline in this sub-sector are worthy of particular attention.67 The production of both basic
metals and metal products grew enormously during the first decade of UDI — to more than a quarter of
value added in 1975 — buoyed by the processing of chrome into ferrochrome and vast increases in the
production of iron and steel. Most importantly, from 1973-75, R$127 million of (nominal) net capital
expenditure took place in "non-ferrous metal and iron and steel basic industries," the single largest amount
of any manufacturing subsector and 43% of the manufacturing sector as a whole.68 In 1974, the Rhodesian
Iron and Steel Corporation — 49% government-owned and the country's largest company — was making
"the cheapest steel in the world."69 By 1977 RISCO was self-sufficient and had doubled its capacity to a
million tonnes per year thanks to an expansion of both steel-making and continuous casting technologies
through cutting-edge Austrian sanctions-busting. Nevertheless, in 1977, just 100,000 tonnes were exported,
whereas at least 400,000 tonnes in exports were required to repay the seller, Voest. Capacity utilisation fell
to 40% of peak 1973 levels.70
Even though in this case (iron and steel)
world market gluts did prove a problem, the
phenomenon of overproduction was already long
evident across a range of capital goods
industries. Base metals producers added year-
end stocks worth 38% of output in 1975,
compared to an average of 30% for the previous
four years, and in subsequent years this rate
increased to well over 50% (Figure 6).
Similarly, metal products (including machinery
and non-electrical equipment) experienced a
ratcheting up of inventories, from levels of
gross output of 20% in the early 1970s, to an
average of 25% from 1974 on, as annual net
capital expenditure in metal products increased
steadily to more than R$8 million in 1975.71 These two subsectors form the largest component of
manufacturing, and their huge output in the late 1970s was at the centre of the overaccumulation crisis. The
problem was not brand new, however. The volume of production of metals and metal products had
expanded by 307% from 1964-74 whereas the entire economy expanded by just 213%. In spite of the high-
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skill nature of metals, the investments paid off in terms of productivity: production volume increased by
just 27% per worker but value added rose 229% per worker (in contrast, the value of wages in the sub-
sector rose by 60% during the same period).72
But such expansive Department One production quickly proved untenable. For Stoneman (using
underconsumption analysis), the capital goods investments were untenable because "their scale was
determined by a biased income distribution and therefore highly restricted market." Stoneman apparently
believed, incorrectly, that such overinvestment would quickly be mopped up by high levels of more balanced
consumption after independence, for he concluded with respect to the mid 1970s investment in capital and
intermediate goods, "All these developments are likely to prove beneficial to the needs of the future
state."73 But there was much more to the problem. From 1974-78, inventories were so large that declines
in the volume of new production of metals and metal products reached 18%.74 Base metal capacity
utilisation fell to a level just 40% of the 1973-74 peak, non-electrical machinery to 45%, and electrical
machinery to 58%. In each case, there were dramatic inventory build-ups while new investments peaked
and then declined markedly. Electrical machinery, while not as large a subsector, witnessed an enormous
jump in inventory build-ups from 25% of gross output in 1975 to 32% in 1976 and 35% in 1977.
Once materials stockpiles build to unprecedented levels and unsold inventories accumulate, the signal
to halt new investment is unmistakeable. Interestingly, stockpiles in the iron and steel subsector accumulated
in enormous quantities from 1977 to 1980 in spite of diminishing new investment and declining capacity
utilisation — there were R$113 million in stocks accumulated at the end of a year of firm economic
recovery, 1979, during which net capital expenditure amounted to just R$2.7 million. Similarly, large stocks
of metal products (typically R$35 million per year) and electrical machinery ($11 million) built up relative
to new investments (R$5 million per year) during the late 1970s. The other subsectors classified by the
World Bank as constituting capital goods showed similar (though unevenly-timed) tendencies, with rubber
losing 14% of capacity utilisation from 1974-78 due in part to extreme overproduction in 1973-74, and
transport equipment 50%.75
The local assembly of transport equipment is also worthy of attention. Transport ranged in
importance as a share of fixed capital investment in manufacturing, from 13% in 1970, down to 7% during
the peak investment years of the mid 1970s, and up to 15% at decade's end. But the absolute level of local
production declined along with the rest of the economy (30% over the 1974-78 period). Capacity peaked
during the Federation expansion, then fell, before picking up temporarily from 1969-75 to levels just two-
thirds those of the early 1960s. Plants designed by Ford, Austin, British Motor Corporation and Morris
Motors ultimately assembled thirteen models of French, Japanese and Italian automobiles, as well as British
Leyland Landrovers.76 Although the transport subsector maintained large inventories relative to gross output
(usually in excess of 30%), the only serious problem with overproduction arose in 1972, when the ratio
reached 42%, and was then resolved.77
5.2 Consumer goods
Consumer goods include some subsectors which overlap with capital goods, including construction
materials industries (consisting of "non-metallic minerals" including clay, cement, asbestos and glass).
Construction, of course, entails both Department One and Department Two built environment functions.
Growth in non-metallic materials — illustrated by expansion of employment from 3,600 in 1965 to more
than 9,000 in 1975 — was due mainly to the local construction boom. But the building boom then
collapsed, and construction fell from 4.9% of GDP to 3.3% by 1979. Meanwhile, however, the cement
industry had reached production capacity of a million tonnes per year, which sat mostly idle in the late
1970s. Inventories of bricks and clay (a separate subsector) rose from 11% of gross output from 1970-72
to as high as 33% in 1977. In addition to bricks, other non-metallic construction materials were worst-hit
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of all branches of manufacturing, declining some 53% from 1974-78 in terms of volume of output, as
inventories climbed from 17% of gross output in 1973 to 34% in 1979.
Other intermediate goods also suffered at crucial points. Evidence of this is seen in the local
production of agricultural inputs. Heavy investments were made in fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides
from 1968-72. However, worsening export conditions contributed, from the mid 1970s, to an enormous
build-up of end-of-year stocks (typically R$15 million) relative to gross output (from 15% in 1973 to 25%
in 1975) and to new investment (R$ 1.5 million). Agriculture-related overaccumulation was more severe than
problems faced elsewhere in the economy.™ Without export markets or a more balanced domestic market,
excessive farm production — of meat from 1971-72 and 1975-77 and of grains in the early 1970s — resulted
in towering inventories. What with the official policy of food self-sufficiency, domestic demand was
expected to pick up the slack when agricultural exports failed. Thus increased barriers to Rhodesian tobacco
sales led to a major infusion of investment in local value-added tobacco products and packaging (R$5.6
million net) from 1974-76. This, however, merely resulted in average annual accumulations of inventories
of 38% of gross annual output from 1974-78, and reduced subsequent net capital expenditure substantially.
Dairy products and beer and wine witnessed overproduction problems earlier, from 1970-73 and 1971-76,
respectively.
A more important Department Two subsector, for export as well as domestic purposes, is textiles.
Ginning, spinning and weaving became increasingly capital-intensive as a result of receiving 8 % of all capital
expenditure in the late 1960s and early 1970s.79 Yet after recording inordinate overproduction in 1973,
another major surge in investments followed from 1974-76 (nearly R$30 million). This led to a dramatic
increase in year-end stocks — from an average of R$13 million from 1965-74, to R$50 million from 1975-
79 — notwithstanding the fact that production levels were cut back 9% from 1974 to 1978 and net annual
capital expenditure waned to R$2.6 million by 1979. The effect was an increase in the ratio of year-end
stocks to gross output from 19% in 1971 to 42% in 1976, before declining again to 33% by 1979. In
contrast, much less significant problems arose in knitted products, clothing and footwear, mainly in the early
1970s. Other manufacturing subsectors that experienced periodic overproduction problems, even before the
1974-78 slump, include furniture, wood products, paper products, and printing, all of which intensified the
broader tendency to overaccumulation beginning in 1973.
There were, on the other hand, subsectors of the manufacturing economy that were barely affected
by overinvestment, where the build-up of stocks was insignificant (sometimes because of perishability, as
in the case of dairy products). As noted above, stocks of beer and wine were sold quickly notwithstanding
impressive levels of new investments and output, aside from the crisis years 1976-77. A distinct lack of new
post-UDI investment was noted by the UNCTAD study in canning, sugar, soap and detergents, matches and
tires.80 However, soaps, detergents and other pharmaceutical products nevertheless overproduced relative
to the size of the local market consistently from 1974.
5.3 The dynamic of overaccumulation
All of this raises the issue Mandel referred to — can the origins of overaccumulation be specifically
pinpointed to a specific Department and sector of the economy? In Rhodesia, the rhythm of
overaccumulation in various manufacturing subsectors relative to the growing overaccumulation crisis in the
economy as a whole, can be crudely measured as a ratio of year-end stocks to gross output, an
"overaccumulation ratio" which for the manufacturing sector as a whole increased from 21% from 1970-73
to 28% in 1976, before falling to 24% at decade's end. It was an extremely high level at this stage, far
higher than any comparable figure over the two-decade period for which data were recorded. This ratio
suggests how the rhythm of overaccumulation affects various departments, sectors and subsectors of the
Rhodesian economy. Table 1 provides overaccumulation ratios for 22 major manufacturing subsectors.
Beginning with the sectors responsible for the greatest volume of manufacturing output — base
metals, metal products, textiles, grain milling, dairy, fertilizers, and meat processing — it is clear that the
worst overaccumulation (with ratios double the average in the late 1970s), was experienced in base metals
(mainly steel). Moreover, the dramatic increase in steel overaccumulation from 1974 is timed exactly with
the onset of general manufacturing stagnation. Metal products showed overaccumulation tendencies no
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Manufacturing Overaccumulation, 1970s
\ Year-end stocks/Gross output
and sector ratio in relation to manufacturing average
Sector (inflation adjusted to $1980)
(1975 output) ratio 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
manufacturing average .206 .210 .214 .213 .229 .255 .279 .271 .257 .237
ratio 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Lbasemeta/s .228 .301 .318 .283 .276 .384 .396 .588 .548 .515
(R$238m) ratio 110 143 149 133 121 151 142 217 213 217
2. metal products .236 .213 .199 .229 .255 .270 .260 .272 .249 .244
(R$212m) ratio 115 101 93 107 111 106 93 100 97 103
3. electrical machinery .258 .242 .243 .248 .273 .249 .316 .347 ,307 .249
(R$60m) ratio 125 115 114 117 119 98 113 128 119 105
4. rubber .198 .175 .176 .272 .268 .219 .238 .260 .273 .251
(RS37m) ratio 96 83 82 128 117 86 86 96 106 106
5. transport .289 .280 .417 .336 .325 .299 .319 .316 .321 .316
<R$80m) ratio 115 180 169 176 168 206 258 116 88 91
6. bricks/clay .105 .113 .109 .136 .163 .199 .272 .329 .213 .197
(RSI 1m) ratio 51 54 51 64 71 78 97 121 83 83
7. construction materials .205 .224 .192 .165 .188 .202 .241 .284 .335 .341
<R$63m} ratio 100 107 90 77 82 79 86 105 130 144
8. fertilizers .226 .165 .188 .150 .193 .245 .198 .161 .173 .202
|R$107m) ratio 110 79 88 70 84 96 71 59 67 85
9. meat products .071 .064 .119 .072 .064 .071 .106 .172 .127 .080
(R$128) ratio 35 31 56 34 28 28 38 63 49 34
10. grains .087 .103 .113 .129 .162 .129 .129 .105 .102 .103
(R$96m) ratio 42 49 53 61 71 51 46 39 40 43
11. tobacco products .296 .256 258 .236 .441 .354 .338 .400 .360 .249
<R$43m) ratio 144 122 121 111 193 139 121 148 140 105
12. dairy products .133 .157 .200 .215 .182 .227 .201 .227 .219 .216
(R$1i9m) ratio 65 75 93 101 80 89 72 84 85 91
13. beer/wine .114 .085 .095 .105 .136 .166 .221 ,189 .162 .149
(R$74m) ratio 55 41 44 50 60 65 79 70 63 63
14. textiles .254 .186 .220 .287 .243 .372 .416 .330 .394 .325
(R$176) ratio 123 88 103 135 106 146 149 122 154 137
15. knitted products .380 .401 .403 .347 .407 .466 .455 .479 .440 .409
(R$26m) ratio 185 191 189 163 177 183 163 177 171 173
16. clothing .334 .436 .322 .312 .318 .294 .290 .281 .291 .289
(R$ 102) ratio 162 208 150 147 139 115 104 104 113 122
17. footwear .280 .242 .257 .281 .271 .213 .248 .257 .228 .259
(R$36m) ratio 136 115 120 132 119 84 89 95 89 109
18. furniture .237 .251 .219 .213 .267 .231 .224 .255 .262 .259
(R$31m) ratio 115 124 102 100 117 91 80 94 102 109
19. wood products .194 .207 .221 .189 .236 .250 .234 .204 .169 .146
(R$26m) ratio 94 98 103 89 103 98 84 75 66 62
20. paper products .224 .222 .195 .198 .221 .241 .240 .277 .233 .219
<R$62m) ratio 109 106 91 93 97 94 86 102 91 93
21. printing .152 .138 .162 .172 .171 .205 .210 .196 .176 .191
(R$54m) ratio 74 66 76 81 75 81 75 72 69 83
22. Pharmaceuticals .255 .267 .240 .232 .318 .339 .305 .303 .297 .271
(R$63m) ratio 124 127 112 109 139 133 109 112 115 143
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worse than those of the economy at large, while textiles hit record levels of overaccumulation in 1975, 1976
and 1978, approximately 50% higher than the economy's average. Each of these sectors was producing
some R$250 million in output by the end of the 1970s.
The next four major subsectoral sources of output, ranging from R$120 million to R$140 million
by decade's end, were grain milling, dairy, fertilizers and meat processing. These agriculture-driven sectors
were profoundly affected by weather conditions, but their periodic introduction of new machinery also had
some effect on the tendency to overaccumulation of stocks relative to output, as previous figures have
demonstrated. Most importantly, however, because the capacity to hold such stocks is extremely limited,
the overaccumulation ratios of these four subsectors in relation to those of the rest of the manufacturing
sector were extremely low. Just as noticeable, was the tendency to increase stocks in the early 1970s rather
than the mid and late 1970s.
Further unpredictable patterns of overaccumulation can be observed in the next most important
sectors, namely clothing and transport (ranging from R$100 million to R$120 million by 1980), which both
witnessed extremely high ratios in the early 1970s (in the vicinity of double the national average), followed
by average ratios in the mid 1970s, and an increase at decade's end. Other subsectors which drove the
overaccumulation process in the mid 1970s (i.e., with a significantly higher ratio than the average from
1974-1978) were tobacco and knitted products.
In sum, there is a relatively uneven sectoral pattern evident, with areas of potential export such as
metals and textiles having vast overcapacity problems in the mid 1970s. It is difficult to pin this down to
disproportionalities between departments of production. Instead, the importance of this data is in its
reflection of the geographical limits to growth, a subject touched on in the next section.81
To put the mid 1970s problem into perspective, consider the period 1957-60, a time when the limits
to spatial expansion in the Central African Federation were also drawing near. Those years experienced
much higher real levels of net capital formation than any subsequent years save 1973-75. The rather high
industrial investments of the 1950s include plant which is by all accounts still in use in a number of branches
and rather old," Wield commented in 1980.82 The circumstances of the late 1960s — when relatively small
volumes of industrial capital were invested in rather wide sectoral extensions — provided little scope for a
full-fledged manufacturing transformation towards intensive export-orientation (as was happening in East
Asia). (Rhodesian manufacturing investment was subsequently extremely intensive, but never achieved the
economies of scale required for export-competitiveness.) The economy was cemented into a disarticulation
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of production and consumption that portended inevitable crisis at some stage, notwithstanding the impressive
flexibility many producers showed within that framework.
Thus the nature — and depth — of the 1970s crisis of the Rhodesian economy was already
predetermined, in a sense, by the ruling class failure to come to grips with the challenge of constructing a
trajectory of sustainable accumulation during the early 1960s. In spite of the state's valiant efforts to balance
investment in the appropriate sectors, the UDI economy placed inordinate emphasis on luxury goods
production for the domestic white market, rather than expanding into extensive low-cost basic consumer
goods which might have helped generate increased effective demand in the process and which would have
had greater export potential into independent Africa. Not only did this climate overencourage producers of
certain capital goods, it ultimately widened the socio-economic and political divisions between whites and
blacks within Rhodesia. Soon, the depth of the economic crisis proved a greater threat to the business
establishment than the prospect of government by nominally-" Marxist-Leninist" forces, with whom business
leaders increasingly sought reconciliation.83
This survey of overaccumulation in Rhodesia during the 1970s highlighted the relationship between
investment and build-up of year-end stocks that was at the heart of the economic slump. But the slump may
have been displaced, temporarily, or at least more effectively managed, were it not for other exogenous
factors that drained the regenerative capacity of the productive sectors. To some degree, crisis displacement
was subsequently attempted by the Rhodesian regime, through both spatial and temporal processes, as
described in the next two sections. Both ultimately proved insufficient. But it is worthwhile to examine why
space and time did not displace capitalist crisis more potently — in contrast to experiences in other places
or in Zimbabwe during the more recent period — in order to enhance the general argument about the depth
and direction of Rhodesia's economic demise.
6. Uneven Development and the "Spatial Fix," 1974-79
6.1 Space and uneven development
To begin, it was clear that geography played a considerable role in the immediate psychological and
material effects of UDI. The enhanced sense of Rhodesian territoriality fostered a ruling class seige
mentality which only deepened over the subsequent decade and a half. Such mentality in turn tolerated
active (though friendly) state regulation — and the imposition of sanctions in 1966 had a bracing
psychological effect, particularly on manufacturers and tobacco growers, whose response was rapid, flexible,
and thoroughly class-conscious.
In terms of the production process itself, manufacturing industries were recovering from an early
1960s slump that had added only very small quantities of investment, and these were weighted towards plant
and machinery rather than land, buildings, vehicles, infrastructure and civil engineering. From 1965-71,
manufacturing maintained a much more spatially- and sectorally-extensive character. Land, buildings and
vehicles rose as a proportion of fixed capital investment, as significant spatial vacuums and outlying markets
still unexploited by capitalist commerce, agriculture, mining and manufacturing were filled. But during the
subsequent upsurge in capital investment, businesses (including mining companies and farmers) turned again
to rather excessively intensive production processes, to their regret.
There were, as well, urban, rural and regional aspects of uneven spatial development, particularly
relating to the construction of the built environment. The cities were affected by factors such as the flow
of capital into white suburban-sprawl development (and to a much lesser extent into Salisbury CBD property)
and the great swell of urbanisation of war refugees that occurred in the late 1970s. Together these provided
a stimulus to (highly-circumscribed) changes in the built environment for collective consumption. And prior
to the pressure of the war of liberation, rural areas — white commercial farms but especially black
communal areas — witnessed an important extension of the agricultural sector across space (though this
quickly reached natural limits).
But before long geography proved to offer fewer opportunities to the realisation of value, as the
wave of industrial investment quickly surpassed the consumption limits of the captive but badly skewed
domestic market. Rhodesian capital had encountered the limits to the "spatial fix" to overaccumulation.
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6.2 The spatial fix
We have observed that overaccumulation in Rhodesia left capital to pile up in sectoral bottlenecks
without being put back into new productive investment, and we have documented other symptoms such as
unused plant and equipment, huge gluts of unsold commodities, and an unusually large number of
unemployed workers. When an economy reaches the stage of overaccumulation, it becomes difficult to bring
together such resources in a profitable way to meet social needs. At the root of this problem is the advance
of the "forces of production" (especially machinery, in the form of automation) beyond the capacity of the
"relations of production" (particularly the skewed distribution of income and wealth characteristic of
capitalism) to reproduce the system.
The only "solution" to overaccumulation — ie, the only response to the crisis capable of
reestablishing the conditions for a new round of accumulation — is widespread "devaluation," which takes
forms as diverse as depressions, banking crashes, inflation, plant shutdowns, and the destruction of physical
and human capital. But devaluation will often be resisted (or deflected) by whatever local, regional, national
or international alliances exist or are formed in areas under pressure. Hence the condition of
overaccumulation has very important geographical and geopolitical implications, as highly contested attempts
are made to transfer devaluation to different regions and nations or to push overaccumulated capital into the
built environment. It is this process that Harvey terms the spatial fix to overaccumulation.8*
During the 1950s, in the previous economic cycle, Rhodesian capitalists had encountered
overaccumulation problems but had managed to temporarily displace these across space. The Central
African Federation helped expand trading markets, and notable investments in the built environment —
ranging from the Salisbury Central Business District to Kariba Dam — captured unprecedented resources.
In addition, the deepening of the financial system provided a variety of other investment outlets for
overaccumulated capital. However, these solutions had unfortunate unintended consequences by the early
1960s, as the Federation ended in political disarray, the built environment was vastly overbuilt, and, as noted
at the outset, the financial system went through a tough period of restructuring and was burdened with a
qualitatively new level of state control.85 Similarly, during the 1970s in many crisis-ridden advanced
capitalist economies, factors such as inflation, rising debt, region-specific deindustrialization, and the transfer
of overaccumulated capital to the Third World had a displacing effect which enabled global accumulation
to continue, slightly checked, prior to the deep 1980-82 recession.86 Many of these temporary fixes to
overaccumulation took a spatial form, in particular the reinvestment of profits in other places far from their
original source, and the development of property markets.
During the 1970s in Rhodesia, the state and foresighted capitalists also sought avenues for
displacement of overaccumulated capital. The limits of geographical displacement are examined first,
followed in Section 7 by discussions of the search for a "temporal fix" through financial flows and state
financial policies. The dual focus in this section is on efforts to expand built environment investments, and
on attempts to address uneven development through displacing investment capital away from the main
business centres (Salisbury and Bulawayo).
6.3 The built environment
Rhodesia was somewhat protected from the effects of international spatial responses to
overaccumulation, because of the lack of new direct foreign investment or credit inflows, and because the
state had erected firm national barriers to competition that might have threatened local manufacturers.
However, one geographical response to crisis in many parts of the world entailed ever-higher levels of
government debt in order to expand the built environment. This applied mainly to infrastructural
investments, often in outlying areas (beyond the major urban centres), but was also partially affected by the
boom in urban property investments through 1974.
In Rhodesia's case, there were strict limits to the implementation of a state-led spatial fix to
overaccumulation. There was an initial effort to shift overaccumulated capital into state-directed investment,
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as central government and public enterprises increased their share of gross fixed capital formation from 37%
in 1974 to 43% in 1976 — largely on the strength of military infrastructure, black housing, posts and
railways and water/electricity supply investments. However, the ratio steadily declined as government
expenditure was subsequently redirected towards recurrent war costs. The brutal nature of counterinsurgency
imposed other constraints to a spatial fix, and in the process further accentuated the deep legacy of rural
underdevelopment.
In addition, the mid 1970s intensification of production processes in industrial districts, in mines and
on commercial farms fostered even more inequality in urban, rural and regional development, which
devastated the vast majority of the Rhodesian population. The towns were overwhelmed by flows of war
refugees, at the same time employment levels in the urban manufacturing sector suffered enormously, and
there were also deep (white) emigration-related cuts in domestic services employment (black maids and
gardeners). Commercial farms were in the midst of their purge of farmworkers, which affected, between
1974 and 1983, some 100,000 employees and their families.
The Rhodesian Front regime is largely to blame for the way the brunt of the crisis was borne by
those in society who were already worst off. Yet the preceding litany of spatial unevenness and human
degradation is not the full story. Many of the other "non-political" factors determining the economy's
geographical limits — eg, world recessionary barriers to exports, the intensive (not spatially extensive)
nature of the mid 1970s investment wave, the limited effective demand for housing commodification in black
townships, overproduction (and subsequent land underutilisation) on commercial and communal farms —
can be traced not merely to state repression and neglect, but to the laws of motion of capitalism itself.
Neither is this meant to excuse the Rhodesian Front regime for failing to creatively invest surpluses that had
built up in the economy. However, it is to argue that the geographical barriers to growth were substantial,
and that in a sense, capital imposed some of these upon itself. The proof of the argument lies in the
endurance of the distorted geographic logic of capitalism following independence. (As noted in Section 8,
an even more uneven spatial fix was implemented in Zimbabwe as some of the other constraints, especially
the immobilising features of war, were lifted.)
6.4 Decentralisation
Even if built environment investments did not mop up overaccumulated capital during the late 1970s,
another spatial fix presented itself as a socio-economic option. In many parts of the world the locational
pattern of cities within regions was placed on the agenda more urgently than ever before. State officials in
increasingly desperate territories kicked off new rounds of interurban and interregional competition between
themselves through promotion of decentralised investment, including the establishment of capital cities in
their hinterlands.87 Often decentralisation policies were inspired by efforts by central governments of any
and all persuasions to establish "growth poles" in underdeveloped regions within their boundaries.
Decentralisation of investment was the subject of long-running debates in Rhodesia.88 As economic
crisis and war intensified in the late 1970s, the urban/rural divide was more striking than ever. Planners
traced regional underdevelopment to the suboptimal location and lack of maturity of secondary economic
centres. Basing their analytical framework on a theory of an urban-rural "dual economy," they generally
advocated the extension of urban market-related institutions and systems (such as credit) into geographical
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areas not fully penetrated by the market.89 The implications of this framework for Rhodesia's emerging
regional policy are important. "Urbanization is well developed at the upper levels but poorly developed at
all other levels," according to a seminal study by Heath in 1978: "If the growth of medium-sized cities can
be encouraged by implementing a vigorous policy of decentralisation, they may become true 'growth points,'
each serving separate regions, attracting migrants from surrounding rural areas, and contributing significantly
to the national economy and overall national development."00
This sort of logic emerged not from an analysis of the real dynamics of Rhodesian colonial capitalism
and the variety of articulations between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production,91 but on an
idealised notion that the spatial extension of capital would improve the lot of the rural peasant. It was a
particularly easy recommendation to make at a time when urban markets were relatively saturated with
investment, as was the case in the mid and late 1970s.
Thus in 1974, the government launched an initial attempt to address the question of regional and
rural underdevelopment through a White Paper, but this, however, "failed to offer specific incentives or
disincentives, or to promote particular growth points in the Tribal Trust Lands, expressing instead merely
a desire for decentralisation anywhere outside Salisbury," according to Davies, who labelled it "a pre-
majority rule concept concerned only with the developed parts of the national space economy."92
Subsequently, a 1976 Regional Town and Country Planning Act delineated six planning regions, though these
were hopelessly biased towards administrative not functional boundaries.
By 1978 a revised policy was issued. According to Heath, "Official thinking appears to be that if
'growth points' can be created in the TTLs, regional disparity will be lessened and the economic
development of the problem areas will be boosted."93 Economic functionality was at the heart of this
approach (although "consultation" with community residents was given lip service and ignored in practice).
But the intellectual reliance upon both orthodox planning models (eg, Christaller central place theory) and
the dual economy thesis, which saw the trees but not the forest, ensured the root causes of uneven regional
development would be ignored.94
In fact, moderate as it was in reconstituting spatial relations, the regional development scheme was
adopted in modified form by the Zimbabwean government after independence. Its lack of real potential to
"solve" uneven development (particularly rural underdevelopment), however, should be seen not merely in
the failure of state bureaucrats to tamper effectively with economic processes (the lesson neo-classical
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economics teaches), but in the overdevelopment of other spaces. Intensive investment processes had, by the
mid 1970s, cemented into the Rhodesian economy such powerful overaccumulation tendencies in the key
urban centres that there appeared no feasible short-term geographical outlet for those funds. After the half-
dozen main manufacturing centres, nowhere else in Rhodesia could begin to offer the infrastructure,
amenities or reserves of skilled labour, given that the basic disarticulated structure of the economy was not
being challenged.95
On balance, therefore, space — whether the built environment or decentralised investment — proved
a relatively ineffectual factor in crisis resolution at the time it was most desperately needed, during the late
1970s, and this is one reason for the great depth of the downturn that Rhodesia experienced. The contrast
with other times and places is evident enough. For example, during the 1950s Southern Rhodesian
industrialists and farmers could depend (for at least a few years) upon expanding Federation and international
markets in order to overcome the tendency to overaccumulation. Likewise, in South Africa during the 1970s
there was a powerful, multi-faceted spatial fix applied through expansion of the built environment, one
implemented by capital as well as government. In contrast, such spatial routes were barricaded in late 1970s
Rhodesia.
What was most wrong, it appears, is that massive and ultimately extravagant intensive manufacturing
and mining investments characterised the mid 1970s. These consequently made it difficult for state and
capital to accomplish a smooth and sustainable switch of funds into more spatially and sectorally extensive
productive circuits. Moreover, the ability of the state to increase infrastructural investments (eg, water and
electricity) or black housing in counter-cyclical fashion during the late 1970s was constrained by mounting
budget deficits and by war. The war itself may have provided some stimulation to the besieged economy,
yet to the degree that it enhanced uneven sectoral development by drawing resources into military
production, this further curtailed effective demand in the consumer market, as witnessed by ever-higher
levels of taxation not to mention the interruption of rural trade in many areas. Furthermore, there were
diminishing prospects for further import-substitutions given the small absolute size of local markets.
In sum, given the contingencies of the UDI period, all these diverse geographical factors ultimately
limited — rather than enhanced — the capacity of capitalists and policy-makers alike to cope with the
economic crisis by systematically displacing it through space. Even more troublesome, perhaps — and in
contrast to the deepening of financial markets during the earlier period — in the 1970s a new set of
constraints emerged which prevented a temporal fix through recourse to finance.
7. Finance and the "Temporal Fix," 1974-79
7.1 The temporal fix
The temporal fix to overaccumulation, Harvey argues, occurs not only through obvious forms such
as speed-up of the production process through new technologies or more rapid transport of goods to market
— neither of which could be revolutionised given technical constraints and overinvestment in existing
manufacturing fixed capital stock present in the Rhodesian economy at the time — but also through the
displacement of overaccumulated capital across time, through recourse to financial markets. The point here
is to find mechanisms to consume and invest now (in order to mop up overaccumulated capital), but to delay
the need to realise the surplus value which is required to provide a return on the investment, until some later
time. To permit repayment for consumption and new investment to be stretched over time, there arise new
financial outlets for overaccumulated capital, including new or expanded forms of credit, and innovative
ways to securitise debt instruments (some of which complement — and exacerbate — existing speculative
investment outlets such as shares and real estate). Across the world the 1970s and 1980s were littered with
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such attempts, which effectively (if only temporarily) displaced overaccumulated capital into financial
markets and provided the illusion that economic stagnation was being postponed indefinitely.96
Indeed by focusing again on developments in the Rhodesian financial system, a great deal more about
UDI-era economic processes and state policies can be made intelligible. By the end of UDI, "The banks
and non-bank financial intermediaries accumulated enormous amounts of financial power," Clarke reported
in the UNCTAD study:
It would probably be correct to state that this accumulation has had a disequalising influence
in the economy vis-a-vis overall asset and income distribution. Not only have the
institutions been able to themselves become powerful economic centres, amassing funds for
their shareholders, but they have tended to be socially and sectorally specific in their credit
and investment policies.97
If Clarke is even partially correct, the monetary and financial system represents an excellent window
on several processes of uneven development and ineffectual crisis resolution which plagued the Rhodesian
economy during the final stages of UDI. For one, the financial system played a short-lived role in capturing
some flows of funds directed away from the circuit of productive capital by manufacturing firms. However,
notwithstanding a tightened monetary policy in the late 1970s, the low rate of return on financial assets —
and especially the lack of likely speculative outlets — limited the attraction of the financial circuit to
increasingly liquid investors. In any case, long-term financial investments were to be avoided in view of
the generalised search for greater liquidity that was underway as an uncertain political transition approached.
In light of the theory and evidence of crisis in the productive sectors covered earlier, how are we
to interpret the role of finance during the late 1970s? What flows of capital were underway and which
institutions accommodated them? What were the indications of the rise in importance of finance, relative
to production and distribution?
7.2 Limits to the rise of finance
In 1974-1975, as manufacturing fixed capital investments peaked, there were noticeable shifts in
funding flows between productive and financial circuits. In his theoretical dissection of overaccumulation,
Mandel argues that "The decline first appears in the following form: a fraction of newly accumulated capital
can no longer be invested productively at the 'normally anticipated* conditions of profitability. This capital
is then increasingly directed to speculation."98 Such tendencies existed in mid 1970s Rhodesia as much as
they did again a decade later in Zimbabwe, but the volumes of funds involved and the preferred outlets were
very different. As overaccumulation became apparent, Rhodesia's four commercial banks were the
immediate beneficiaries." When they offered a new three-year time deposit, their fixed and savings
deposits soared to extraordinary levels — RS313 million in 1975 (a 92% increase over 1974) — partly on
the basis of R$15 million in new funds drawn from firms in manufacturing, mining and agriculture (Figure
7).100 Indeed from 1973-1977, the share of GDP contributed by finance and insurance rose impressively
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Bank 1974 1976
Standard 236 314
Barclays 167 227
Rhobank 89 113
Grindlays 53 72
(Source: Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe, pp.102,125.)
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from 3.9% to 6.6%. Bank profits were consistently strong, and in relation to total gross operating profits
jumped from 1% in 1965 to nearly 5% in 1977 (although they receded when industrial capital subsequently
began to recover).101
Later, the banks* tendency towards "delinking"
from industrial investment under such conditions was
subsequently confirmed by a rapid decrease in loans to
manufacturing and other value-producing sectors,
concomitant with an increase in loans to finance and
insurance companies between 1976 and 1979.102
Finance was the only area of the economy to increase
its commercial bank indebtedness in real terms in the
late 1970s, as even public sector borrowing declined.
But under these conditions, it would be wrong to treat
these symptoms of a rising financial circuit of capital
— in particular the large 1975 bank deposits by
industrialists — as "speculative" (in Mandel's usage).
The rate of return on financial assets was often
guaranteed (especially in time deposits) and was generally negative in real terms,103 which suggests the
depth of the overinvestment crisis. On the other hand, the deposits were not without a risk component, since
nationalisation of the country's banks was being taken seriously by 1978, with Rhobank publicly lobbying
against it.104 (Nationalisation was the one sustained radical proposal made during subsequent UNCTAD
discussions.)105
The crucial difference between financial sector investments in the late 1970s and the late 1980s rests
on the lack of viable speculative outlets. Aside from bank deposits, which provided listless returns, other
outlets for holders of liquid funds looked even gloomier as the downturn deepened and as foreboding
political change grew closer. Real estate, for example, was considered too long-term — even staid pension
and provident funds rapidly disinvested their property loans and building society shares at a rate of more
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behaviour:
On the one hand, under conditions of continuing expansion and intensification of speculation, a fall in the
average rate of profit must entail constantly greater recourse to credit, and therefore an aggravation of the
indebtedness of companies... The credit boom is practically inevitable, since the banks strive to avert chain
reaction by failures which could cause them severe looses. There is thus an imperceptible shift from a boom
to an "overheated" economy. For Ihe time being, this further veils the forces inexorably preparing the crash...
On the other hand, as the expansion, not to mention the overheating, develops, instances of excess production
capacity, that is potential over-production, must inevitably appear, (original emphasis) ("Theories of Crisis,"
p.37.)
Yet borrowing by Rhodesian manufacturers and mining firms turned out to be a rather short-term response to the crisis,
and in 1979 fell sharply as internally-generated revenues recovered.
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than 10% per year during the late 1970s, and as insurance companies pulled back even faster.106 The
Rhodesian Stock Exchange offered little relief, as it only began its recovery in 1978, and as turnover was
well below the level reached in 1980.107
Soon another important shift occurred in the financial system's liability structure. Liquidity rose
significantly as the transition to majority rule approached. In 1975, financial liquidity levels were generally
close to the regulatory minimum required for building societies and finance houses, but over time they
loosened considerably in all financial institutions (banks, for example, at one point in 1979 held R$120
million more in liquid assets than required). In 1977, investors moved tens of millions of dollars from the
commercial banks to a "flexi-deposit" scheme of the building societies which featured easier liquidity. Then
investors switched time deposits worth tens of millions of dollars into yet more liquid savings and checking
accounts (demand deposits) in commercial banks, with the outflow peaking in March 1980, a month before
the election (Figure 7). Similarly, the "cash-on-hand" of pension and provident funds rose from R$25
million in 1978 to R$48 million in 1980.'08
In the waning years of Rhodesia, insurance assets shifted dramatically, as well. In 1979, finance
and insurance firms invested R$26 million in new buildings, accounting for a full 7% of national gross fixed
capital formation that year. During the previous seven years, the sector had invested a total of just R$21
million in new buildings (0.8% of gross fixed capital formation).109 But more generally, insurance
companies registered declining property portfolios, as both mortgages and investments (in houses and landed
property) fell from R$61 million in 1976 to R$48 million at independence. Stocks and shares also declined
through 1979. Yet during the same period total insurance assets soared from R$4I4 million to R$690
million. Most of the increase was funnelled into government securities and non-specified investments, and
cash-on-hand rose from R$44 million in 1976 to R$64 million in early 1980. The sector was led by SA
Mutual Life Association (Old Mutual), which accounted for nearly half of all local insurance assets.110
In sum, the expansion of the financial sector in the last years of the Rhodesian economy was not
sustainable under conditions where liquid funds could simply not be invested in well-established speculative
markets such as shares and property, as these markets were not in the least attractive until the mid 1980s
(see Section 8). Partly because of the anticipated political turmoil, partly because with regulated interest
rates the returns on financial assets were low, and partly because the emergence of overaccumulation in the
productive sectors was relatively recent, the Rhodesian financial circuit lacked the kind of growing power
that was in evidence in many other parts of the world. A decade later, things would be very different, partly
as a result of state policies adopted soon thereafter, which for the most part were sustained into the 1980s.
7.3 State policy and politics
There are several areas of state financial policy to consider. First, the devaluation of the Rhodesian
dollar in the mid 1970s represented an about-face on a twenty-five year old practice. Second, a relatively
conservative monetary policy continued to have a subordinate status relative to counter-cyclical fiscal policy
during the slump. Third, the fiscal stimulus that the state could have provided through expanding the credit
system beyond mild increases in government borrowing — for example to fund longer-term infrastructural
development — was also underutilised (relative to other state revenue sources). Finally, financial capital
played a role — though nearly invisible — in broader debates about the impact of the transition to majority
rule.
In 1975 the Rhodesian dollar was devalued by 10% against the South African rand and 8% against
major currencies. In late 1977, Rhodesia announced another 3% devaluation against the rand and 6% against
the major currencies. And again in April 1978, there was a devaluation, this time 5% against the rand and
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8% against the major currencies.111 Exchange control — especially multinational corporate profit
repatriation — was toughened marginally in 1976.112
Simultaneously, in real terms monetary growth slowed in 1975 and 1977, and monetary velocity
slowed even in years (1976, 1978, 1979) that the money supply increased, thanks to what Kadhani calls
"radically restrictionist policies of the classical IMF short-run stabilisation variety."113 Green suggests,
"Over 1974-79 Rhodesia (as it then was) ran an IMF type stabilisation programme — for different reasons
and also without using Fund resources."114 Yet the bank rate was consistent at 4.5% and treasury bills
were offered at a low 3.5%, so it is clear that a restrictive interest rate-based monetary policy was not
invoked to these ends.115 As statistics cited earlier suggest, liquidity in financial markets remained high.
Ironically, the "IMF short-run stabilisation" effect was apparently achieved through higher taxes (including
a huge 12% surcharge imposed in 1977) and wage restraint, which together were key vehicles for slowing
consumer spending.
Fiscal policy appeared far more powerful than any manipulation possible on the monetary side, as
the government budget deficit reached an astonishing 15% of GDP in 1979.116 But the precise use of the
Rhodesian fiscus was not optimal for crisis displacement. Generally, it should be possible to displace the
contradictions of overaccumulation crisis through temporally-extended investments (such as major
development projects), which absorb funds in the present, but which entail the need for more intensive
surplus value extraction in the future. This was certainly the approach used in much of the Third World in
the late 1970s. In Rhodesia, however, there ultimately emerged a powerful psychological sense, from 1977
or so, of the difficulty of displacing the economic crisis to a future time through long-term public works
infrastructural investment (especially when that investment came under increasing military attack).
Notwithstanding the barrage of official propaganda about the unpopularity of the Patriotic Front liberation
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movement amongst the masses, smart investors turned decidedly liquid during the late 1970s, fearing the
eventual outcome, a government led by Robert Mugabe and ZANU.
Thus on the one hand fiscal policy played something of a counter-cyclical role, though not as strong
or strategic as could have been the case without the pressure of war. On the other hand, the Finance
Ministry and Reserve Bank risked adopting perhaps an excessive degree of monetary conservatism in the
late 1970s. While this might have pleased equally-conservative bankers concerned about rising inflation and
the potential for currency degradation, the corresponding deflationary impact on the economy did little to
pave the way for a smoother political settlement.
And indeed there exists little concrete evidence of a positive role played by financial institutions in
the political transition. What little information there is does not contradict the general thrust of these
conservative trends. There was, for example, an effort to attract foreign financial capital to Rhodesia. This
would have more than a psychological impact — it would also tie the future state to the dictates of foreign
creditors (including the parents of the Rhodes!an bank branches). As early as 1968, the local chairperson
of Standard Bank suggested, "What is needed, and will only be possible with a settlement that would bring
an end to sanctions, is a massive injection of outside development capital to create the necessary job
opportunities."117
But notwithstanding promises of billions of dollars in development finance by British and US
negotiators in the event of a political settlement, financial sanctions prevented international financiers from
playing anything beyond a very minor role in the Rhodesian economy, and no role at all in the Lancaster
House settlement.118 The World Bank, whose 1950s Kariba Dam loan and other credit extensions the
Smith government had defaulted on in 1965, appeared to have a definite — if somewhat limited — agenda
in Rhodesia. As Mugabe put it in 1979,
In the wake of the escalating war and the flight of so many European settlers, an African
petit-bourgeoisie is being formed very rapidly as Africans move into white farms, suburban
homes and even jobs. In 1974, with the help of the World Bank, local European
businessmen launched a fund and a Foundation, called the Whitsun Foundation, to provide
capital to the new black petit-bourgeoisie to buy property and to initiate a variety of
economic studies. The national development plan proposed by the Foundation is a blueprint
for neocolonialism that militates against the freedom of the future independent State of
Zimbabwe to embark upon programmes for socialist transformation.119
These words proved prophetic. Both the Bank and the Whitsun Foundation strongly promoted credit
expansion as a rational — and still profoundly market-oriented — approach to post-independence
"development." However, in contrast to such far-sighted liberal initiatives, local financial institutions played
only a muted role in the political transition, in spite of their economic power.120
In sum, in contrast to the importance Clarke attributes to finance in the late 1970s, the attempt to
find a temporal fix to overaccumulation through expansion of the financial sector — both in terms of assets
and in terms of political power — was not effective. The rise of finance was truncated and politically
irrelevant.
Financiers should theoretically have supported efforts to set the stage for a transition of formal state
power to black nationalists that would retain die basic features of the Rhodesian capitalist system, but in
deracialised form. Those depended quite heavily on infusions of credit, into black townships, rural areas
and small black-owned businesses. The feasibility of such visions of small farmer credit and housing finance
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might have been recognised as highly dubious,121 for at the end of the day domestic financiers did not
discover any effective vehicles for providing sustainable levels of credit to black borrowers (with the
exception of those from the nascent middle-classes desegregating the formerly whites-only suburbs). This
was due, as usual, to insufficient levels of effective demand.
So whereas in many economies in crisis the search by financiers for spatial and temporal
displacement was unrelenting, the Rhodesian ruling elite had few options. Characteristic of the spatial fix
was the vastly increased use of the "chicken run" (white emigration) to South Africa. As for the temporal
fix, the liquid state of the financial markets just prior to independence suggests the psychological bearing
of those capable of pulling off a temporal fix was just as shaky. What is most important about the partial
emergence of financial markets during this period, however, is that notwithstanding a set of political and
policy-related contingencies that limited the operation of a temporal fix through finance, the underlying
tendency was indeed operative: overaccumulated capital flowed out of fixed manufacturing capital
investments and into the financial markets.
As the final section shows, it was only in the mid and late 1980s that this tendency was given free
reign, and that the long-term crisis of stagnation experienced by Zimbabwean capitalists, whose roots we
have traced to their vast overinvestment in fixed capital during the mid 1970s, ultimately led to a full
transformation in the nature of the Zimbabwean economy. But this was not a transition to a socialist
Zimbabwe, as the liberation movement promised, but ultimately to a decontrolled, deregulated peripheralised
capitalism subservient to extremely powerful international financial markets.
8. Accumulation Crisis: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe
This paper has attempted to incorporate the sectoral, spatial and temporal aspects of uneven
development in 1960s and 1970s Rhodesia, by focusing on the way deep-rooted, underlying crisis tendencies
emerged and played themselves out. Classical Marxist economic crisis theory has been important in this
task, even if it was entirely overlooked by other commentators as a tool for examining the UDI period.
During the late 1970s, even self-described Marxist researchers (especially those affiliated to the liberation
movement) adopted a variety of non-structural interpretations of the most crucial issues: the impact of
sanctions, the scope for post-independence redistribution, economic power relations, engagement with the
international system, the forthcoming "transition to socialism."122
There was, unfortunately, very little effort to root these issues in the dynamics of sectoral
accumulation, space and time. Instead the economic downturn was either attributed to exogenous, once-off
factors, or too closely derived from the international crisis, or at best seen merely in terms of
"underconsumption" (only one half of the equation). Deeper problems in sustaining accumulation, following
the deluge of mid 1970s capital investments, were passed over, and their longer-term ramifications — such
as tendencies towards increased financial liquidity, corporate indebtedness and speculation, all of which
exploded in the late 1980s — were largely ignored. Why is all of this important to point out, nearly twenty
years after the crisis began?
One of the more questionable of comments on post-independence economic policy was this by
Stoneman: "Although the policy was far from coherent, it laid the basis for rapidly rising real profits in the
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late 1980s, and thereby a resolution of the crisis of the 1970s." He cites as a "measure of this success...
the continuous rise in the industrial index on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange from under 300 in 1986 to
2,300 earlier this year [1991], the fastest sustained rise in the world."123 Stoneman was not alone; the
World Bank also tended to equate capital market performance with the underlying health of the economy and
in May 1989 wistfully argued that the ZSE was "undervalued."124 In contrast, Standard Bank's Economic
Review reported in September that year, "Major institutional investors already consider even quality shares
highly overpriced on current dividend yields."125 Within six months (February 1990), Deloitte and Touche
business consultants issued similar warnings about "share price inflation."12* Bard Discount House
economist Nigel Chanakira was even more blunt: "Investors appear to have grown indifferent to
fundamental factors and information, in a stampede to acquire shares way beyond historical levels,"127
Few paid attention, and share speculation reached epidemic proportions. In money terms, the ZSE
capitalization of approximately 50 listed companies rose from a 1984 low of Z$85 million to Z$1.4 billion
by the end of a speculative wave in 1987, and soared to Z$7 billion by early 1991, reaching a peak of Z$9.5
billion in September.138 So it was three months after publication of Stoneman's analysis, the ZSE crashed,
ultimately losing 65% of share value. What had been celebrated as a "measure" of Zimbabwe's economic
prowess was in reality a reflection of a fatal disease: speculative gains had taken the place of real
investment, and insider trading and financial scams of various sorts proliferated.129
A deeper analysis of the long crisis of industrial stagnation in Zimbabwe would have identified the
directions in which over accumulated capital flowed, as manufacturers failed to generate substantial new
employment and maintained an effective capital investment strike throughout the 1980s. The most
conspicuous symptom of stagnation is the incessant decline in the percentage of the population formally
employed, which peaked in 1960 at 19%, declined but peaked again in 1975 at 17%, and steadily dropped
to below 12% in the early 1990s.
Investment also remained stagnant. From 1985-1988, a period of growth in the volume of
manufacturing output, the rate of Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP averaged just
12.5%, one of the lowest on record.130 (Whereas conventional wisdom blamed the investment strike on
foreign exchange shortages,131 the easy availability of forex following the 1990 development of the Open
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General Import License did not lead to appreciable new capital investments but rather to stockpiling and
luxury goods purchases.)132
What was missing in Stoneman's and the World Bank's analysis was a focus on how financial
investments became a form of temporal displacement (not "resolution/ as Stoneman has it) for the deeper
crisis. Similarly, attention to the spatial dimensions of crisis displacement would have been in order. While
decentralisation initiatives failed and the state ran out of funds for major infrastructural projects, the built
environment — especially the Harare Central Business District — nevertheless hosted unprecedented real
estate speculation in the late 1980s. The key impetus appears to have come from commercial banks, which
sunk an unprecedented Z$70 million into 550 Harare mortgage bonds (mainly commercial) during six months
from May 1984.'" Indeed, harking to the late 1960s, financiers in the late 1980s again fed the flames of
real estate speculation; in 1989 alone they pushed 65% more funds into property markets (Z$1.4 billion in
17,600 bonds) than the year before, leading to a 25% increase in value of property sales in Zimbabwe.134
In 1990, the value of property sales was up to Z$860 million, and 21,000 mortgages were registered worth
Z$2.1 billion. Central Harare alone was responsible for Z$500 million in new commercial investments in
1990, which typically took the form of flashy post-modern palaces built for or by financial institutions. The
pace was maintained into the first half of 1991, with Z$ 1.374 billion in (10,700) mortgage bonds registered
over the six month period.
The property market then crashed as rapidly and convincingly as the ZSE, as residential, commercial
and industrial property prices fell on average 35% from mid-1991 to the present, and commercial rental
charges dropped by 50%.135 A symbolic event was Lonrho's May 1991 decision to withdraw from
construction of a major new hotel between 3rd and 4th Streets and Samora Machel and Union Avenues.136
Aside from generalised overbuilding, the main catalyst was an interest rate increase mandated by the World
Bank (in September 1991 short-term rates went from 20% to 40% nearly overnight).
In the name of financial deregulation and trade liberalisation (a potent combination of temporal and
spatial fix), the preferred investment outlets for Zimbabwe's overaccumulated capital stood exposed as
shams. Worse yet, the desired export-led reorganisation of the manufacturing sector, under the aegis of the
World Bank's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, offered no signs of success.137
m ( . . . continued)
"Dutch disease" because of the observed impact of the North Sea gas production on the Dutch economy. The
strong export revenues from gas caused an appreciation of the Dutch guilder against other currencies which then
exposed local industries to more intense foreign competition, causing unemployment. Large foreign aid inflows
can be a special case of the "Dutch disease." Such large foreign aid inflows have in fact had similar effects on
Egypt, as those generated by export revenues from cocoa on Ghana's economy, copper on Zambia and petroleum
revenues on oil producing countries.
In the Zimbabwean case, the large inflows of foreign aid were likely to raise the price of inputs
demanded by a certain sector (what we may call the booming sector) and initially increase the wages and salaries
in this sector. In Zimbabwe, the booming sector was invariably the public sector at the beginning but it later
on spread to other sectors. The other sectors that were likely to benefit directly from the boom were the
services, utilities and transportation sectors... Thus the sector that stands to lose in this spending and resource
movement effect is the manufacturing sector and in particular the still fragile heavy-industrial base of the
economy, the capital goods sector. (Ndlela, D. [1984], "Sectoral Analysis of Zimbabwe's Economic
Development with Implications for Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange," Zimbabwe Journal of Economics, v. l ,
n, July, p.72.)
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